Beyond Afrocentrism: Prerequisites For Somalia To Lead African De-colonization And De-Westernization

Taormina. Sicilia.

Clepsydra of Karnak

The oldest water clock of which there is physical evidence dates to ca. 1391-1353 BC, during the reign of Amenhotep III where it was used in the Temple of Amen-Re at Karnak. This alabaster water clock has 12 carved columns of 11 false holes, corresponding to the hours of the night. The water flowed through a very small hole made in the center of the bottom, emerging on the outside under the figure of a seated baboon. To know the time, one had to look inside the basin to observe the water level and read the time according to the nearest false hole. The outside surface of this clepsydra, or water clock, is decorated with figures and text that show symbols of certain planets and constellations and give a list of the protective spirits for each of the ten days of the ancient Egyptian week. The middle register, or section, is occupied by the circumpolar stars under the aspects of various gods and animals. Now in the Egyptian Museum, Cairo. JE 37525 Read more

Votive tablet depicting Shamash, the sun-god of Sippar, seated in his shrine with the Babylonian king Nebopaliddin being led into the God's presence by two figures. Babylonian art, 9th century BC.

Learn more https://www.archaeologs.com/w/sippar/

Το Ιράν των Αγιατολάχ: ένα Μασωνικό Παρασκεύασμα - αποκαλύπτει ο Έλληνας Ιρανολόγος καθ. Μουχάμαντ Σαμσαντίν Μεγαλομμάτης

Ayatollahs' Iran: A Freemasonic Fabrication, reveals the Greek Iranologist Prof. Mohammad Samsaddin Megalommatis

ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”

Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 27η Σεπτεμβρίου 2018.

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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2018/09/27/το-ιράν-των-αγιατολάχ-ένα-μασωνικό-παρ/ =============================

Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient

Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία

Αναδημοσιεύω εδώ ένα εντυπωσιακό άρθρο του Έλληνα ανατολιστή ιστορικού και πολιτικού επιστήμονα, καθ. Μουχάμαντ Σαμσαντίν Μεγαλομμάτη, ο οποίος διαλύει πολλούς μύθους που υπάρχουν στην κοινή γνώμη σχετικά με το Ιράν ως τάχα ‘αντίπαλο’ της δυτικής Νέας Τάξης Πραγμάτων.

Αρχικά δημοσιευμένο το 2007, το ανατρεπτικό άρθρο αναδημοσιεύθηκε σε πολλά ιρανικά πόρταλς της Διασποράς επειδή οι Ιρανοί κατάλαβαν εύκολα το τι έλεγε για την χώρα τους ο εξαίρετος Έλληνας ιρανολόγος, ο οποίος έχει μελετήσει την ιστορία του Ιράν και έχει περιπλανηθεί στην χώρα εκείνη όσο ελάχιστοι άλλοι ειδικοί.

Ayatollahs’ Iran: a Nationalistic Theocracy as Freemasonic Machination

By M. Shamsaddin Megalommatis

Saturday 22 December 2007

http://www.fravahr.org/spip.php?article411

and https://www.academia.edu/24267250/Ayatollahs_Iran_a_Nationalistic_Theocracy_as_Freemasonic_Machination

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The current theocratic and utterly unrepresentative regime of Iran was not the choice of the peoples and nations of Iran. The events that triggered the fall of Shah and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini were all machinated by an Apostate Freemasonic Lodge that controls part of the French and the English establishments and through them part of the American establishment.

The danger that the late Shah of Iran represented for their eschatological plans was absolutely tremendous. This does not imply that they intended to help establish a pseudo-Shia theocracy in Iran; simply they were not able to completely control the developments. As a matter of fact, the late Shah intended to modernize, industrialize and westernize Iran in the 70s; one could compare his attempt to that of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, 50 years earlier.

A strong Iran next to a strong Turkey is enough to make the Anglo-French colonial establishments spend years without an easy sleep. Although this would look good for Western geo-political and geo-strategic interests, particularly in containing Tsarist Russia / USSR / Putin’s oligarchy, in real terms of Western Freemasonic conspiracy in the Middle East it is abominable because it would hinder all Freemasonic plans and projects for the Middle East, the area of their primary concern par excellence.

Mossadegh received by Truman

Mossadegh was a Freemason Islamist. His supporters became later the supporters of Khomeyni and founders of the Islamic regime.

It sounds awkward but it is absolutely real: the late Shah of Iran tried with a delay of 17 years (as of 1970) to implement the basic concepts of the Iranian nationalistic policies of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, a great Iranian statesman whom the Freemasonic mass media of the West did their ingenious best to defame and ridicule, while falsely portraying him as … related to the Iranian Communist party!

[In fact, Mohamad Mossadegh was himself a Freemason and an Islamist. His so-called nationalism was no more than an International-Islamism inspired by Freemasonry — Fravahr]

When Madeleine Albright, decades later, admitted that the Eisenhower administration was involved in the Operation Ajax that ended with the Mossadegh’s removal, she did not state any other reason except geopolitical considerations. In fact, these considerations were Freemasonic eschatological approaches to the Middle East, covered by English economic interests, and involved volumes of falsified information produced in order to mislead the gullible and deeply unaware American establishment — through use of pro-English agents who were active in Washington D.C.

The Shah himself must have felt in the early and mid 70s how right Mohammed Mossadegh was. In his last days in Tehran, the Shah must have also remembered his father’s last days in the throne, when in September 1941 the English had forced him to abdicate in favour of his young son, as they could not accept Iran’s neutrality in WW II.

The Freemasonic anti-Iranian conspiracy played on the Iranian peoples’ feelings against the Shah, and involved the return of Ayatollah Khomeini who had spent some months in France. In fact, the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge pushed to the political forefront Iranians who had already lived and studied in France where they had become Freemasons, like Mehdi Bazargan, Khomeini’s first Prime Minister, and Abolhassan Banisadr, the first Iranian President.

They were joined in their effort to canalize the Iranian Revolution by Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who had studied in America, and had travelled with Ayatollah Khomeini from Paris to Tehran on February 1st 1979 to become later Foreign Minister (after Banisadr) and then be arrested and executed (September 1982) as betrayed by President George H. W. Bush. After 1983, Freemasonic influence on Iranian policies has been indirect.

Indirect manipulation involves the mental, spiritual, philosophical, ideological, and therefore political engulfment of the targeted establishment into erroneous perception of the present realities and the future targets of the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge within a context that can be rather parallelized with an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Shia Eschatology in contrast with Freemasonic Messianism

Worship of Isis

Freemasonic ritual as on the walls of the Isiac Freemasonic Lodge (Temple of Isis) at Pompeii

The worship of Isis is depicted in this wall-painting from Herculaneum. The high priest stands at the entrance to the temple and looks down on the ceremony beneath him, which is supervised by priests with shaven heads. In the case of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Freemasonic establishment’s arsenal reaches its limits. Drawing from a late Sassanid Zervanism that survived within Shia Islam since the early days of the Islamic conquest of Iran (636: Sassanid defeat at Qadisiyah, 641 Sassanid defeat at Nihavent, 651: arrival of Islamic armies at Merv in Central Asia), Shia Eschatology revolves around the prevalence of Time as determinant element in the Mystic History of the Mankind; this is utterly alien to Western Freemasonic dogmas and doctrines that draw from Late Antiquity’s Gnosticisms, Hermetism, and Messianic Isidism.

With Khomeini’s doctrine based on the termination of the Ghaybah (“Occultation”) of the Shia Islamic Twelfth Imam (the Shia version of the Messiah) by means of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we reach one step closer to what is called in Islam Al Yom al Ahar (“the End of Time”).

Despite the fact that Iran and most of the Islamic World are engulfed in ignorance and confusion due to the academic systems that Freemasonic Europe produced to facilitate the advent of the Freemasonic Messianic, namely the Hellenism, the Orientalism, the Pan-Arabism, and the (Sunni) Islamism, the Shia establishment of Iran, sticking to the completion of the work initiated by Ayatollah Khomeini, have little chance to be misguided and deceived.

Contrarily to the Freemasonic concept of a Horus — Messiah, creation of Isis (as Freemasonry is symbolized within the Freemasonic eschatological doctrine), a Zervan — Twelfth Imam hinges on the absorption of all into a New Aeon with little concern about an Elected People to be saved.

Contrarily to a Horus — Victorious King and Pacifier, the concept of Zervan — Twelfth Imam involves the liberation of every person from the negative energy therein encrusted through various ways; as Zervan Akarana promises a monstrous appearance, yet able to embody the Loftiest of the Divine, the Shia Islamic Twelfth Imam promises no peace and no return for any elected people, but heralds the miraculous transformation of the miserable into luminous sources in the present world (after Al Yom al Ahar) and the Hereafter (Al Yom al Qiyamah).

There is certainly a Manichaean influence on the late Sassanid Zervanism (and through this system on the Shia Islam) but the Western stern rejection of Manichaeism proliferated only confusion and dire practices among the Apostate Freemasons. In fact, the Freemasonic Apostasy is a repetition of an earlier Apostasy that took place in the Late Antiquity, and caused the disastrous descent into the Middle Ages.

Unable to transcend, the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge seems set for disastrous developments that will now cover the entire surface of the Earth. Determined to continue an evil process started by Napoleon and sped up by Edmund Allenby, the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge seems today unable to perceive the impending domino effect that will ensue from an attack on Iran. The Apostate Lodge machinated the Anglo-French colonialism in order to create a false and precarious Israel (for Jews, not Israelites), thus exterminate both Jews and Palestinians (after a supposed final peace), and then set up a true Israel able to accommodate the migrating — because of expected ominous natural phenomena — English, Irish, Scots, French, Belgian, Dutch, and Scandinavians (namely the true descendants of the Ten Tribes of Israel). That final Israel that would span between the rivers Euphrates (Assyria) and Nile (Egypt) may simply never come to existence because of the rise of a New Era for the Middle East triggered by an attack on Iran.

The Advent of the End of Time

If Ahmadinejad referred to Mahdi’s advent (which means automatically the End of Time) already in his first speech at the UN (in September 2005), what happened meanwhile that indicates that by now an apocalyptic scenario would follow an American attack on Iran? Why what could happen in March 2006 should not occur in December 2007?

The answer to such a question is at the same time a full response to a great number of eschatological interpretations. The History of the Mankind can also be viewed as a History of missed opportunities. More recently, after 2001, to give an example, the US could have pacified Iraq, if they had the knowledge and the courage to do what it would take. Simply, they were either unaware or misled. Usually, to know how a solution can be found to a historical — political problem, one has to transcend; this mainly means that one has to see the problem in question as a non-problem, or place it within wider frame, or view it through different standpoints, or apply all these methods. Basically, a historical — political problem’s solution involves the non-consideration of a part’s interests.

An answer to the aforementioned question is at the same time a complete rejection of numerous approaches to historical texts of eschatological contents. As a matter of fact, there has always been a vast interpretational literature of the Prophetic books of the Bible, of the Revelation, of the Apocalyptic Hadith, and of the eschatological traditions of various peoples from India to Mexico. With the inception of the web, and the rise of spiritual interest in a post-Communist world, the interpretational interest only multiplied. Specifications and clarifications about the time of the arrival of Mahdi, the Messiah, Jesus as Islamic Prophet, Jesus as Christ of the Christian religion, etc. can be found in great number.

All these approaches emanate from a world plunged into the swamp of Time, a world whereby all people take for granted that Time exists. Yet, the Mankind existed for several thousands of years without shaping the concept of Time. For many great thinkers and wise elders in Sumer, Akkad, Egypt, Assyria and Babylon, Hittite Anatolia, and Biblical Israel, Time simply did not exist. The interaction of Being and Becoming was perceived completely differently, particularly by peoples who used the same word for “day” and “time” (e.g. umu in Assyrian — Babylonian). In a world viewed, perceived, sensed, and experienced diachronically, there is little place for fanaticism and empathy, as all reflect an eternal recapitulation of everything.

In that world, great diachronic (and therefore apocalyptic and eschatological) Epics were compiled for a first and original occasion, and their elements, data, concepts and details were later diffused among later epics, mythical texts and apocalyptic literature. As a matter of fact, there is nothing original that was not already said before Moses. To give an example, it is sheer ignorance for anyone to believe that the concept of the Antichrist goes as back as the Revelation and Daniel.

More than 1500 years before the Revelation, for the Anatolian Hittites the Antichrist (Ullikummi) would rise from the Sea. The author of the Revelation reassessed the same topic, adding only an effort of identification of the Messiah (Tasmisu for the Ancient Hittites — Jesus as Christ for the Christians). More than 2000 years before Isaiah, the concept of the Messiah existed in the Egyptian Heliopolitan Doctrine.

Viewing the present world through the eyes of an Egyptian, Assyrian or Hittite erudite scholar would offer a completely different perspective, and certainly more authoritative as emanating from a diachronic consideration of the Mankind’s and the World’s existence. In most of the cases, this was avoided because of the salacity of Western Orientalists, who instead of serving truth, did promote preconceived ideas either of Freemasonic or Christian Catholic nature. What would destroy pillars of their false faiths had to be covered by silence; this is the “veracity” of the Western universities’ professors.

2007: A Changed World and Iran

In fact, many things have changed over the past 21 months; they are not easily visible to average people and supposed leaders. Even worse, it seems that they are not ostensible to panicked establishments and elites either.

Losing a unique opportunity to be the sole superpower and thus accomplish the wishes of the Founding Fathers, the US will have to become familiar with the reality of a multi-polar world.

If we exclude the nonsensical nuclear mutual destruction, which will be always a possibility, as long as nuclear weapons exist, America’s interests can be hit at any moment. America lost considerably because America allied itself with the only country they should never work together: England.

Discrediting America, exposing the US, while mobilizing others’ forces to contain America and finally avert a long perspective Pax Americana, England convinced the US leadership to pursue the only way that can truly damage the US interests: action against the Moral Principles that the Founding Fathers stipulated so clearly for the then young and promising, Anti-Colonial, nation that would diffuse Freedom, Justice and Democracy to the rest of the world.

The US leadership failed to assess that it would be detrimental to pursue after 1991 immoral practices employed at the times of the Cold War. The policy of double standards (two measures and two weights) would convince all possible adversaries that the US represents a threat, and would mobilize many against America. The enumeration could be very long.

Vice-president Cheney’s trip to Saudi Arabia in November 2006 was certainly taken very seriously by the Iranians — within eschatological context, I mean. The Islamic Messiah will certainly exterminate a cursed, Satanic regime in charge of Haramayn, the two holy cities of Mekka and Madinah.

One would not ask America to believe the Islamic eschatological literature; but one would anticipate America to take it into account, and shape its policy accordingly. The rest is just inane.

Saudi Arabia cannot exist — if Israel is to survive!

It was a pathetic American effort to continue English Colonial policies of division and strife in the Middle East; these policies targeting the existence of the Ottoman Empire and Imperial Iran, if pursued by America, against Turkey and Iran, can guarantee the total disaster of America.

Yet, Prof. Huntington, in a moment of truth, exposed the truth plainly, when he attributed the Islamic Extremism and Terrorism to the lack of a core State for the Muslim world. This was precisely the work of the Anglo-French Apostate Freemasonic Lodge that we already mentioned. America should not be confused with the Anglo-French secondary conflicts, as highlighted by the San Remo arguments between Clemenceau and Lloyd George.

For America’s interests to prevail, for the present state of Israel to survive, for a solution of the quasi-permanent Palestinian problem to be found, America should avoid any direct interference in the affairs of the Muslim World.

Any US attack against Iran would trigger an unexpected and unsuspected reaction that would certainly have a lot to do with Islamic eschatological expectations.

The explosion would immediately bring in other, sizeable, non-Islamic countries that are ready for a severe collapse of the present global economic structures, as their economies are better suited for barter trade. These countries would not necessarily help Iran militarily; they would simply make impossible for America to sustain the cost of a conflict spanning from Yemen and Israel to Afghanistan and Pakistan, at a moment Saudi and Emirati oilfields would not be anymore functional.

America should keep itself outside the Muslim World, and following the instructions of Prof. Huntington, help (with the cooperation of Israel) the rise of a core Muslim country in the Middle East that would eradicate the nefarious colonial deeds of the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge.

This country should be a secular and humanist, democratic country that would be committed to the elimination of Pan-Arabism and Islamic Extremism. To support the rise of a vast Oriental State, America should fervently oppose France and England.

This would redraw the map of the Middle East, but ultimately save the present state Israel, offer peace to the Palestinians, and grant concord to the other Middle Eastern countries. Only a vast Oriental State would have no problem in containing Iran and outmanoeuvring the Ayatollah regime.

Otherwise the Death will hit America — in an irrevocable and precipitated way.

Europe would be affected too; and that Apostate Freemasonic Lodge would be severely persecuted in a new — unrecognizable — Europe ruled by a new Iron Man of the North.

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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:

https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250701066

https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/iran_of_the_ayatullahs.docx

https://vk.com/doc429864789_621631094

https://www.docdroid.net/HEpNSXC/to-iran-ton-aghiatolakh-ena-masoniko-paraskeuasma-docx

“Lots of stories written in these ancient papers, showing a lot. Good moments, bad moments, victories, defeats, lessons from the past. One small look in them can teach you what lies beneath those unlimited sands.”

Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες της Τουρκίας: ενάντια σε Ερντογάν, Ισλαμιστές, Κουρμάντζι (‘Κούρδους’) και όλους τους Δυτικούς

Turkey's Zaza Qizilbash: against Erdogan, the Islamists, the Kurmanji (the so-called Kurds), and all the Westerners

ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”

Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 27 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019.

Αναπαράγοντας τμήματα σχετικών ομιλιών μου και στοιχεία από συζητήσεις μας, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει ένα καλά κρυμμένο, απροσέγγιστο από δυτικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες, και συνεπώς άγνωστο, εντελώς αστάθμητο παράγοντα της Τουρκίας και του ισλαμικού κόσμου: τους Ζαζά Αλεβίδες Κιζιλμπάσηδες. Προσθέτει μάλιστα βίντεο, φωτογραφίες και χρήσιμη, επιστημονική (αλλά σε ορισμένα σημεία ιδιαίτερα μεροληπτική) βιβλιογραφία για το θέμα αυτό, το οποίο θα απασχολήσει ιδιαίτερα τον κόσμο λίαν προσεχώς.

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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/09/27/ζαζά-κιζιλμπάσηδες-της-τουρκίας-ενάν/ ==================

Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient

Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία

Σε πολλά κείμενά μου έχω αναφερθεί στην σημερινή Τουρκία κι έχω τονίσει πόσο τεράστια άγνοια της εκεί πραγματικότητας χαρακτηρίζει τους ψευτο-επιστήμονες της Ελλάδας, τους τιποτένιους κι αμόρφωτους ψευτο-καθηγητές, τους τάχα γεωπολιτικούς αναλυτές, τους ΚΥΠατζήδες, και τους δημοσιογράφους.

Αυτοί οι εγκληματίες θέλουν κατακρεούργηση χωρίς δίκη από τα πλήθη των εξαπατηθέντων και κοροϊδευμένων επί δεκαετίες Ελλήνων. Εξαιτίας τους ο μέσος Έλληνας δεν έχει ιδέα για το τι ακριβώς συμβαίνει στην Τουρκία και το τι είναι ενδεχόμενο να συμβεί από την εκεί σύγκρουση πολλών αντιθέτων κι αντιπάλων κοινοτήτων και ομάδων που επιμένουν να δείχνουν προσήλωση στην εθνική, θρησκευτική και γλωσσική ταυτότητά τους.

Τα σχέδια καταστροφής της Τουρκίας από τις εχθρικές προς αυτήν δυτικές χώρες (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, Ισραήλ, ΗΠΑ) εκλαμβάνονται από τους αμόρφωτους Έλληνες ψευτο-πανεπιστημιακούς, δημοσιογράφους και πολιτικούς ως εφικτά κι αυτή η ηλίθια αντίληψη οφείλεται τόσο στην εθελοδουλεία του ελληνικού κατεστημένου προς την Δύση όσο και στην παντελή άγνοια που έχουν όλοι τους για την Τουρκία.

Έχω ήδη τονίσει ότι δεν υπάρχουν Κούρδοι κι ότι δυτικοί διπλωμάτες, οριενταλιστές και στρατιωτικοί παράγοντες έχουν παρασκευάσει στα χαρτιά ένα ψευτο-έθνος το οποίο δεν είναι ένα αλλά αποτελείται από πολλά διαφορετικά έθνη με διαφορετικές θρησκείες και γλώσσες που, αν όλα τους υποχρεωθούν να μπουν μέσα στα σύνορα ενός κράτους, θα κατασφαχθούν μεταξύ τους για το ποιος θα κυριαρχήσει.

“Κουρδιστάν” είναι το ισοδύναμο του να πει κάποιος “Ευρώπη” και να βάλει μέσα στο νεόκοπο αυτό κράτος Ρώσσους, Τούρκους, Ουκρανούς, Έλληνες, Ιταλούς, Πολωνούς, Γερμανούς, Γάλλους, Άγγλους και πολλούς άλλους, και να τους αφήσει να …. κυβερνηθούν.

Απλώς θα σκοτωθούν.

Αλεβίδες Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες χορεύουν τον θρησκευτικό χορό των Αλεβίδων Σεμά σε μια πλατεία στο Αντίγιαμαν.

Στην Τουρκία δεν υπάρχουν “Κούρδοι” πολύ απλά γιατί Κούρδοι δεν υπάρχουν πουθενά.

Αν συγκεκριμένα αναφερθεί κάποιος στις σημερινές εθνο-γλωσσο-θρησκευτικές ενότητες της Τουρκίας, θα διακρίνει:

1- Τούρκους Σουνίτες

2- Τούρκους Αλεβίδες

3- Ζαζά – οι οποίοι είναι Αλεβίδες (: Σιίτες)

4- Κουρμάντζι (αυτοί μόνον είναι οι ‘Κούρδοι’) οι οποίοι είναι Σουνίτες (τα Κουρμάντζι είναι τόσο διαφορετικά από τα Ζαζάκι όσο τα ισπανικά από τα τουρκμενικά)

5- Αραμαίοι Χριστιανοί

6- Αραμαίοι Μουσουλμάνοι αραβόφωνοι

7- Γιαζίντι – οι οποίοι μιλούν Κουρμάντζι αλλά δεν δέχονται να έχουν καμμιά σχέση με τους Σουνίτες Κουρμάντζι, και

8- μικρότερα έθνη (Αρμένιοι, Έλληνες) ή έθνη που έχουν αφομοιωθεί μέσα στους Τούρκους, όπως σε μεγάλο βαθμό οι Λαζοί.

Οι Αλεβίδες Ζαζά αντιδρούν στην επιχειρούμενη από τις δυτικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες ‘κουρμαντζο-ποίηση’ (ή ‘κουρδοποίηση’) και απορρίπτουν και την όποια συνεργασία με τους Κουρμάντζι.

Παράλληλα, απορρίπτουν την πολιτική των ισλαμιστικών κυβερνήσεων της Τουρκίας, συμμετέχουν ενεργά μέσα στα κόμματα της κεμαλικής αντιπολίτευσης, και έχουν συνδεθεί πολύ έντονα με τους Τούρκους Αλεβίδες.

Μέσα στους Αλεβίδες Ζαζά το μυστικό κίνημα των Κιζιλμπάσηδων αναβιώνει την θρησκευτική πίστη και οργάνωση του θρησκευτικού τάγματος των Μπεκτασήδων, έτσι τραβώντας αμετάκλητα τους Αλεβίδες Ζαζά μακριά από τους Κουρμάντζι, τον Ερντογάν και τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες των δυτικών χωρών.

Δείτε το βίντεο για να καταλάβετε πως έχουν τα πράγματα στην σημερινή Τουρκία.

Περισσότερα θα βρείτε στο εισαγωγικό σημείωμα (σε ρωσσικά, αγγλικά κι ελληνικά) και σε ένα άρθρο για τους Ζαζά, οι οποίοι στην γλώσσα τους ονομάζονται Ντιμλί.

Ο όροι ‘Αλεβί’ (: Αλεβίδες) και ‘Κούρδοι’ δηλώνουν τα εξής:

‘Αλεβί’ (δηλαδή Σιίτες της Τουρκίας) είναι εθνικά είτε Τούρκοι, είτε Ζαζά.

‘Κούρδοι’ σημαίνει Κουρμάντζι. Όλοι οι Κουρμάντζι είναι Σουνίτες.

Η αντιπαράθεση Αλεβίδων και Σουνιτών δεν συνεπάγεται εμπλοκή όλων των πληθυσμών: οι Σουνίτες κεμαλιστές Τούρκοι είναι θρησκευτικά αδιάφοροι.

Αντίθετα, οι Αλεβίδες κεμαλιστές Τούρκοι και οι Αλεβίδες κεμαλιστές Ζαζά δείχνουν ένα μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον για την θρησκεία και τις παραδόσεις τους.

Έτσι, στην σημερινή Τουρκία, διαμορφώνονται πέντε μεγάλα εθνο-γλωσσο-θρησκευτικο-πολιτικά σύνολα:

1. Κεμαλιστές, χωρίς θρησκευτικά ενδιαφέροντα – κυρίως Τούρκοι Σουνίτες

2. Αλεβίδες – Τούρκοι και Ζαζά, αμφότεροι φιλο-κεμαλιστές

3. Σουνίτες Ισλαμιστές – κυρίως Τούρκοι Σουνίτες και αρκετοί Κουρμάντζι που αρνούνται την ‘κουρδική’ τους ταυτότητα, και υποστηρίζουν τον Ερντογάν και μια ισλαμική σουνιτική Τουρκία

4. Σουνίτες Παντουρανιστές – μόνον Τούρκοι με άλλους από αυτούς να τείνουν προς τον κεμαλισμό και άλλους να τείνουν προς τον ισλαμισμό. Δεν υπάρχουν Αλεβίδες Τούρκοι Παντουρανιστές.

5. Κουρμάντζι αντι-ισλαμιστές και αντι-κεμαλιστές

Δείτε το βίντεο:

Кызылбаши Зазаки танцуют религиозный алевитский танец Семах на публике: Адыяман, Юго-Восточная Турция

https://www.ok.ru/video/1518627523181

Περισσότερα:

Это скорее вопрос исторической иронии – видеть людей, которые изображены на больших рекламных щитах в здании за площадью, где Кызылбаши Зазаки танцуют семах, религиозный танец в Адиямане, ЮВ Турции! Смотрите эту часть: 10:22 – 10:31

Справа налево вы можете увидеть:

1- Али: первый имам и четвертый халиф ислама, центральная персона шиитов

2- Хаджи Бекташ: 13 в. Исламский философ, мистик, основатель ордена Бекташи

3- Кемаль Ататюрк

4- Государственный флаг Турции

5- реклама организации или мероприятия, и

6- Сейид Риза (в Зазаки: Pîr Sey Riza): родился в Тунджели (ранее известный как Дерсим) в 1863 году, он был приговорен к смертной казни и повешен в Элазиге в 1937 году. Он был религиозным лидером Бекташи в Заза и начал восстание против Кемала Ататюрка.

Это посмертное сосуществование Кемала Ататюрка и Сейида Ризы на рекламном щите, созданном Зазаки Кызылбаши, несколько иронично. На самом деле, после смерти Ататюрка, все Зазаки приняли светское государство, которое он установил; раньше они голосовали в основном за левоцентристские политические партии. Они предпочитали современное светское общество, а не религиозное суннитское государство.

И они ближе к алевским туркам, чем к суннитским Керманджи («курды»). Таким образом, Зазаки бросают вызов Эрдогану, исламистам, западным спецслужбам и дипломатам, которые таким образом не смогут сфабриковать так называемый «Курдистан». Больше:

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Али_ибн_Абу_Талиб

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Хаджи_Бекташ

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бекташи

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Дерсимская_резня

Δείτε το βίντεο:

Qizilbash Zaza dance the Semah, a religious Alevi dance, in public: Adiyaman, SE Turkey

https://vk.com/video434648441_456240310

Περισσότερα:

It is rather a matter of historical irony to notice those depicted on the big billboards in the building behind the square where Qizilbash Zaza dance the Semah, a religious dance in Adiyaman, SE Turkey! Watch this part: 10:22 – 10:31

From the right to the left, you can see:

1- Ali: first imam and fourth caliph of Islam, central person for the Shiites

2- Haji Bektash: 13th c. Islamic philosopher, mystic, founder of the Bektashi Order

3- Kemal Ataturk

4- The national flag of Turkey

5- The advertisement of an organization or event, and

6- Seyid Riza (in Zazaki: Pîr Sey Riza): born in Tunceli (previously known as Dersim) in 1863, he was condemned to death and hanged in Elazig in 1937. He was a Bektashi religious leader of the Zazas and started the rebellion against Kemal Ataturk.

This posthumous coexistence of Kemal Ataturk and Seyid Riza on a billboard set up by Zaza Qizilbash is somewhat ironical. As a matter of fact, after Ataturk’s death, Zazas accepted the secular state that he had established; they used to vote mainly for center-left political parties. They preferred the modern secular society instead of a religious Sunni state. And they are closer to Alevi Turks than to Sunni Kermanji (: ‘Kurds’), thus defying altogether Erdogan, the Islamists, and the Western secret services and diplomats who will thus fail to fabricate a so-called ‘Kurdistan’.

Δείτε το βίντεο:

Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες χορεύουν δημόσια Σεμά (Semah – Θρησκευτικό Χορό): Αντίγιαμαν (Adıyaman), Ανατολική Τουρκία

Περισσότερα:

Όλη η ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας βρίσκεται στο 10:22 – 10:31 του μικρού αυτού αποσπάσματος από ένα χορό που μπορεί να διαρκέσει πάνω από μια ώρα.

Στην δημόσια εκδήλωση αυτή, κρέμασαν μάλιστα οι Ζαζά Αλεβίδες Κιζιλμπάσηδες μεγάλα πόστερς στα κτήρια απέναντι από την πλατεία του Αντίγιαμαν της νοτιοανατολικής Τουρκίας όπου χόρευαν τον παραδοσιακό, θρησκευτικό χορό Σαμάα (Σεμά στα τουρκικά). Τα πόστερς αυτά είναι η ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας γιατί φέρνουν μαζί και κάνουν να συνυπάρχουν τα εξής ιστορικά πρόσωπα (από τα δεξιά προς τα αριστερά όπως βλέπουμε):

1- Αλί (601-661: Αλί Ιμπν Αμπί Τάλεμπ), ξάδερφος και γαμπρός του Μωάμεθ, πρώτος ιμάμης και τέταρτος χαλίφης, κεντρικό πρόσωπο της πίστης όλων των Σιιτών του Ιράν, των Αλεβιτών της Συρίας και των Αλεβίδων της Τουρκίας. Εννοείται ότι κάθε δημόσια απεικόνιση του Αλί είναι μια θρησκευτική πράξη που παλιότερα απαγορευόταν στο κοσμικό – λαϊκό (secular – laic) κράτος του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ. Στο κάτω μέρος της αφίσας βλέπετε γραμμένο Hz. Ali, δηλαδή Hazrat Ali που η πιο κοντινή απόδοση στα ελληνικά είναι ‘Ιερός Αλί’. Αρχικά, η λέξη, προφερμένη χαντράτ στα αραβικά (και έπειτα χαζράτ σε φαρσί, τουρκικά και ουρντού) σήμαινε ‘παρουσία’ και σε περίπτωση θείας παρουσίας ‘επιφάνεια’. Σχετικά:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadrat

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prophets_and_messengers_in_Islam

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali

2- Με ιδαίτερο καπέλλο εμφανίζεται ο Χατζή Μπεκτάς (1209-1271), ιδρυτής του θρησκευτικού τάγματος των Μπεκτασήδων στους οποίους ανήκαν Τούρκοι Αλεβίδες.

Οι Μπεκτασήδες κι οι Μεβλεβήδες ήταν τα πιο σημαντικά θρησκευτικά τάγματα στην Οθωμανικη Αυτοκρατορία, αλλά από ένα σημείο και μετά οι Μπεκτασήδες καταδιώχθηκαν.

Οι Μπεκτασήδες δεν ταυτίζονται με τους Κιζιλμπάσηδες,οι οποίοι ήταν ένα στρατιωτικό τάγμα, και συχνά μεσολαβούσαν στον Οθωμανό Σουλτάνο υπέρ των Κιζιλμπάσηδων.

Οι Μεβλεβήδες ήταν Τούρκοι Σουνίτες και το τάγμα τους ιδρύθηκε από τον Τζελαλεντίν Ρουμί (1207-1273).

Αμφότεροι, Χατζή Μπεκτάς και Τζελαλεντίν Ρουμί, προέρχονται από την ίδια μακρινή από την Ανατολία περιοχή: το σημερινό βορειοανατολικό Ιράν και βόρειο Αφγανιστάν.

Ο θρησκευτικός χορός των Μεβλεβήδων Δερβίσηδων (σεμά) απέκτησε μεγαλύτερη φήμη αλλά και οι Μπεκτασήδες αφοσιώνονταν στον θρησκευτικό χορό με σκοπό την ενεργοποίηση της σύνδεσης σώματος και ψυχής και την υπέρβαση. Υπάρχουν διάφοροι τύποι σεμά.

Όλα τα τάγματα είχαν καταργηθεί επί Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ και κανένας δεν μπορούσε δημόσια να δείξει μια φωτογραφία, πόσο μάλλον να αναρτήσει μια αφίσα, του Χατζή Μπεκτάς. Σχετικά:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haji_Bektash_Veli

https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Μπεκτασήδες

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bektashi_Order

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sama_(Sufism)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhikr

3- Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ

4- Τουρκική σημαία

5- Αφίσα μιας πολιτιστικής-θρησκευτικής εκδήλωσης, και

6- Σεγίτ Ρεζά (Seyit Rıza, στα ζαζάκι: Pîr Sey Riza / γεννημένος στο Τούντζελι, πρώην Ντέρσιμ, το 1863, καταδικάστηκε και κρεμάστηκε στο Ελάζιγ το 1937) ο οποίος ως μπεκτασής θρησκευτικός αρχηγός των Ζαζά οργάνωσε την εξέγερση κατά του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ το 1937-1938 .

Η εξέγερση εκείνη ψευδώς παρουσιάζεται από τα εχθρικά προς την Τουρκία κράτη της Δύσης (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, ΗΠΑ, Ισραήλ) ως τάχα ‘κουρδική’ σε μια άθλια φαλκίδευση της Ιστορίας.

Στην πραγματικότητα ήταν μια αντι-κουρδική, αντ-εθνική, θρησκευτική εξέγερση εναντίον του κοσμικού – λαϊκού κράτους του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ.

Κανένας Κουρμάντζι (: Κούρδος) δεν είχε συμμετάσχει κι η εξέγερση καταπνίγηκε στο αίμα. Σχετικά:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dersim_rebellion

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seyid_Riza

Είναι λοιπόν ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας να παρουσιάζονται δίπλα – δίπλα ο Ατατούρκ και ο Σεγίτ Ρεζά, έστω κι αν οι δύο ηγέτες είχαν συναντηθεί και συνομιλήσει.

Ωστόσο, οι αφίσες αυτές αντανακλούν και την πραγματική κατάσταση της σημερινής Τουρκίας την οποία τα ελληνικά, δυτικο-ευρωπαϊκά και βορειο-αμερικανικά ΜΜΕ αλλοιώνουν και παραποιούν οικτρά με σκοπό να κάνουν τις ευρύτερες μάζες να έχουν ολότελα στρεβλή εικόνα της κατάστασης. Αυτή έχει περίπου ως εξής:

Οι Ζαζά στην Τουρκία βαθμιαία αποδέχθηκαν το κοσμικό – λαϊκό κράτος του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ στις δεκαετίες 1950 -1980. Αυτό συνέβη επειδή το κράτος αυτό αντιστοιχούσε περισσότερο στον τρόπο ζωής και στις παραδόσεις τους από όσο ένα θρησκευτικό σουνιτικό κράτος.

Οι Ζαζά συμμετείχαν ενεργά στην τουρκική πολιτική ζωή της Τουρκίας και ανήκαν σε κεντροαριστερά κόμματα. Σ’ αυτό συμπαρέσυραν και τους Κουρμάντζι (: Κούρδους) που μένουν σε ακόμη πιο νοτιοανατολικές περιοχές.

Η θρησκευτική όμως διαφορά των Ζαζά (που είναι Αλεβίδες) από τους Κουρμάντζι (που είναι Σουνίτες στην πλειοψηφία τους) έφερε τους πρώτους πιο κοντά στους Τούρκους Αλεβίδες. Το κίνημα των Κιζιλμπάσηδων εκμεταλλεύθηκε την πολιτική των τουρκικών κυβερνήσεων των τελευταίων 15 ετών και προξένησε ανάμεσα σε Τούρκους και τους Ζαζά της Κεντρικής κι Ανατολικής Τουρκίας μια αναβίωση του μπεκτασικού τάγματος.

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Διαβάστε:

Dimlī

Dimlī (or Zāzā), the indigenous name of an Iranian people living mainly in eastern Anatolia, in the Dersim region (present-day Tunceli) between Erzincan in the north and the Muratsu (Morādsū, Arm. Aracani) in the south, the far western part of historical Upper Armenia (Barjr Haykʿ).

They are also found in Bingöl, Muş, and the province of Bitlis, as well as around Diyarbekir (Dīārbakr), Siverek, and Sivas (for details, see Lerch, p. xxi; Haykuni, p. 84; Andranik, pp. 111-16; Hadank, pp. 8-9; Erevanian, pp. 1-20; Halajian, 1973, pp. 9-100; Gasparian, p. 195; Bruinessen, 1978, p. 30). About 300,000 Dimlīs live in western Europe, mainly in Germany. Some of them are political refugees. The total population of Dimlīs at present is unknown, but it can be estimated at 3-4 million.

The people call themselves Dimlī or Dīmla, apparently derived from Deylam (Andranik, p. 161 n. 1; Hadank, pp. 2, 11-12; Minorsky, 1932, p. 17; idem, 1965, p. 159 n. 21), as appears from Armenian delmik, dlmik, and the like (Yuzbashian, pp. 146-51), which must be derived from *dēlmīk “Deylamite.” The Deylamite origin of the Dimlīs is also indicated by the linguistic position of Dimlī (see below).

Among their neighbors the Dimlī are known mainly as Zāzā, literally “stutterer,” a pejorative perhaps owing to the relative abundance of sibilants and affricates in their language (Hadank, p. 1; MacKenzie, p. 164; cf. zāzˊā “dumb” in Arm. dialects of the Vaspurakan area).

Armenians also call them Delmik, Dlmik, Dmlik (see below), Zaza (Alevi) Kʿrder, Čʿarkʿəčʿikʿ(Halajian, Dersimi azgagrakan nyutʿer [DAN], passim; Mkrtčʿian, pp. 54-55), and Dužik or Dužik Kʿrder, the last after the name of a mountain in Dersim (Spiegel, II, p. 65).

The Armenian term Kʿrder, literally “Kurds,” in this context denotes social status or mode of life, rather than nationality. Even those Armenian authors who use the term Kʿrder explicitly distinguish the Dimlī from the ethnic Kurds (Halajian, DAN, p. 242; for similar use of the term in the Middle Ages, see Minorsky, 1943, p. 75). In Turkish the Dimlī are known as Dersimli and Qezelbāš (i.e., Shiʿite).

The appearance of the Dimlī in the areas they now inhabit seems to have been connected, as their name suggests, with waves of migration of Deylamites ii from the highlands of Gīlān during the 10th-12th centuries. Unlike the Kurds, the Dimlīs are mainly sedentary cultivators, though animal husbandry occupies a considerable place in their economic activities. They are especially renowned as horticulturists.

Dimlī society is tribal, a sociopolitical, territorial, and economic unit organized according to genuine or putative patrilineage and kinship, with a characteristic internal structure. It encompasses forty-five subtribes, each divided into smaller units. The most prominent are Ābāsān, Āḡāǰān, Ālān, Bāmāsūr(ān), Baḵtīār(lī), Dǖīk, Davrēš-Gulābān, Davrēš-Jamālān, Hay-darān(lī), Hasanān(lī), Korēšān, Mamikī, and Yūsufān.

The names of some small subtribes consist of patronymics combined with the Turkish word uşak (servant), for example, Ā(r)slānušāḡī, Ābāsušāḡī, Farhādušāḡī, Šāmušāḡī, Tōpūzušāḡī, and Ḵōčušāḡī (Spiegel, I, p. 758; Andranik, pp. 156-57; Molyneux-Seel, p. 68; Dersimi, pp. 18-19, 24-28). The chiefs of the most important subtribes, called seyīds (sayyeds), are both religious and secular clan leaders and thus exercise considerable influence upon the tribesmen.

Religion

As the names Alevi (ʿAlawī) and Qezelbāš imply, most Dimlīs are Shiʿites, often considered extremist, though some are Sunnis. The religious beliefs of the majority, in common with those of most Shiʿite extremist groups, are characterized by great variety.

They venerate ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭāleb as the most important incarnation of God, but they also profess an admixture of indigenous primitive and some Christian beliefs. Within this framework the cult practice of the Dimlī inhabitants of each individual region displays specific features, reflecting the absence of a centralized religious institution, like those in Christianity and Islam, that might standardize cult practice and dogma.

God is known as Hū/ŭmāy, Hōmā, and Haq (Adontz, pp. 11-12; Tēr Minasian, p. 22; Asatrian, 1991, p. 10; idem and Gevorgian, p. 502).

The Dimlīs themselves call their religion by the Turkish term yōl-ušāḡī “followers of the [true] path” (Molyneux-Seel, p. 64), a designation with mystical overtones. The influence of folk Sufism on Dimlī religious beliefs is so thoroughly blended with indigenous elements as to permit no definite identification.

It may be reflected, however, in the hierarchy of the priesthood, the structure of the community, and the cult of Xizir (Ḵāżer, Ḵeżr) Īlyās; in the last, however, elements of the Armenian Surb Sargis (Saint Sergius) are also recognizable. The feast of Ḵizir, considered an incarnation of ʿAlī/God, coincides with ʿAli-bayrami (the feast of ʿAlī), also known as Aḡa-bayrami (God’s feast) among the Qezelbāš of the Mākū region, as well as with the Armenian feast of Surb Sargis (Asatrian and Gevorgian, p. 503 n. 25; Müller, pp. 29-30; see also Abeghian, pp. 95-97).

It is usually celebrated in February. Christian elements are assimilated to Shiʿite conceptions (as in the example of Xizir) or have been adopted directly from the Armenian population of Dersim, for example, the rites of communion, baptism, and worship at Christian shrines and churches (e.g., the Sūrb Kārāpēt monastery, Hālvōrī vānk in the Dǖīkbābā mountains, and Dēr Ōvā [Arm. Tēr Ohan, Saint John] monastery near Sēlpūs/zdāḡ).

There are also perceptible remnants of “nature worship,” including worship of mountains (e.g., Mūnzūrdāḡ, Dǖīkbābā, Sēlpūs/z, Sēl), rocks, springs (e.g., Kānīyē Hazratē Xizirī“the spring of Ḵeżr” on the slopes of Dǖīkbābā and Kānīyē ānmāhūtyan “the spring of immortality” at the foot of Sēlpūs), trees (mainly oaks), and animals (snakes, rabbits, etc.). The cult of the snake, considered a holy creature, is most distinctive.

It has been symbolized by a stick called čūē haqī (God’s stick), the top of which is carved in the form of a snake’s head. It is preserved in a green cloth bag suspended from a wooden pillar (ērkyan) in the sanctuary of the village of Kiştim near Dersim. The stick is believed to be a piece of the rod of Moses and the bag a copy of the one carried by St. John the Baptist (Halajian, DAN, pp. 475-80; Molyneux-Seel, p. 67).

The čūē haqī is used in cult ceremonies on the feast of Xizir Īlyās, which is celebrated after a three-day fast, during which, according to some reports (Mkrtčʿian, p. 51), even cattle and other livestock are not fed. On this day thousands of pilgrims gather in the village to gaze upon the holy staff (ēvlīyā keštīmī “the saint of Kiştim”; for details, see Dersimi, pp. 97-98; Halajian, DAN, pp. 475-80; Haykuni, p. 133; Erevanian, p. 79; Müller, pp. 27-28; Asatrian and Gevorgian, p. 508).

One noteworthy trait of Dimlī religious rituals is the equal participation of women, which has often served as an excuse for accusing them of ritual promiscuity and calling them by derogatory names (e.g., čirāḡ-kušān, čirāḡ-sōndurān, mūm-sōndurān, ḵurōs-kušān “candle extinguishers”) suggesting participation in orgies (e.g., Fontanier, p. 168; Mkrtčʿian, p. 51).

The Dimlīs’ profound hatred of the Turks, in contrast to their mild and friendly attitude toward Armenians, may partly reflect the fact that they, like the Ahl-e Ḥaqq and Yazīdīs, rigorously deny that they are Muslims and stress their claim to follow a distinct religion (Bruinessen, 1991, p. 12; Molyneux-Seel, p. 64).

Antagonism to the Turks has also acquired a clear nationalistic character, which is currently being expressed in the powerful upsurge of a Dimlī separatist movement in Turkey (Taławarian, p. 79; Asatrian, 1992a, pp. 104-05; idem, 1992b, pp. 8-9; idem, 1993, p. 7).

Beside special public places for performing their religious ceremonies (tekke), the Dimlīs, like the Yazīdīs, also worship in private houses, including those of their religious leaders (Taławarian, p. 64; Müller, p. 228; Asatrian, 1992a, p. 105). They are mostly monogamous, though, according to some authors, polygamy, limited to no more than four wives, is also exercised. Divorce is strictly forbidden.

Dimlīs do not practice circumcision (Trowbridge, p. 348; Müller, p. 25; Asatrian, 1992a, p. 106; Mkrtčʿian, p. 55).

Four clans (Āḡāǰān, Bāmāsūrān, Kurēšān, and Davrēš-Jamālān) are the traditional custodians of Dimlī religious doctrine. Religious offices are hereditary. The highest, that of pīrī-pīrān (cf. Pers. pīr-e pīrān, elder of elders) may also be conferred by ordination within the hereditary line.

Successively lower levels are pīr, seyīd, dede, muršīd, and rayvar (cf. Pers. rahbar). Such terms as “mulla” and ulem (Ar. and Pers. ʿālem) are never used in non-Sunni Dimlī religious affairs. The pīrī-pīrān is the theocratic head of the community. His wife (ana) enjoys almost equal rights in managing family affairs (Halajian, DAN, pp. 464-65).

Dedes and seyīds, who never shave or have their hair cut, perform wedding and funeral rites (Haykuni, p. 86). Rayvars, the lowest class of clergy, have the social status of ordinary laymen (ṭālebs). They are not paid for their services, which include visiting members of the congregation, performing daily religious rites, and ensuring that the religious and ethical norms of the community are observed.

They can punish the guilty but are not allowed to show clemency. Only the pīrī-pīrān, upon the application of the supreme council (jamāʿat), a mixed secular and clerical body, may forgive sins. The nonreligious affairs of the rayvars are attended to by their families or lay volunteers (Halajian, pp. 463 ff.). A curious social aspect of the Dimlī community is the institution of moṣāḥeb (perhaps “holy brotherhood”).

Similar institutions, called birē āxiratē and xūškā āxiratē (brotherhood and sisterhood of the next world), and šarṭ-e eqrār exist also among the Yazīdīs and Ahl-e Ḥaqq respectively (Asatrian, 1985; idem and Gevorgian, p. 507).

Language

Dimlī (Zāzā) belongs to the Northwest Iranian language group (Windfuhr). It is known from several dialects, Sīvērēk, Kōsā, Čabāḵčūr, Kiḡī, Bujāq, Ōvāǰīḡ, and others, which, however, do not differ greatly.

Phonology

The Dimlī phonological system is the same in all dialects, with only slight variations. The vowel system consists of eight phonemes and two diphthongs (Cabolov), which are transcribed variously in the recorded texts (Chart 1).

The long vowel phonemes have no significant allophones, whereas the range of allophones of the short vowels and diphthongs is quite wide:/a/:[a, i, ē/ĕ]; /i/:[ī/ĭ, a, e]; /u/: [o, ü], etc.; /au/: [au, aū, ou, eu]; /ai/: [ai, ēi, aī], etc.

The Dimlī consonant phonemes are shown in Chart 2. The affricates c, j, and cʿ and the aspirated series pʿ, tʿ-, kʿ are found mainly in northern dialects (Erzincan, Dersim). Armenian influence is the most likely explanation of the existence of these phonemes, which are not otherwise found in modern West-Iranian languages (Vahman and Asatrian, p. 268). The /čá/ represents a mediopalatal surd affricate (= -tš-, Arm. č, Kurmānjī čˊ), which is apparently common to all Dimlī dialects.

Historically Dimili j corresponds to Middle Iranian ǰ, while čá, c, and cʿ all continue Middle Iranian č; for instance, jau “barley” (< *MIr. *ǰau), c/cʿim “eye” (< *čehm < *čašm), and cʿilā “lamp, candle” (< *čirāḡ); cīcag “flower” < *čīčag, cf. Turk. çiçek, etc.).

The opposition between a rolled ṟ and a simple flap r is found also in Kurmānjī. The marginal phonemes /ʿ/ and /ḥ/ occur in some dialects under the influence of Kurmānjī Kurdish.

In certain dialects older š is commonly represented by s, for example, sit or šit “milk” (cf. Parth. šift), gōs or gōš “ear” (cf. Pers. gūš), hū/ŭsk “dry” (cf. Pers. ḵošk, Kurdish hišk), mask(a) “churning bag” (cf. OPers. maškā-, NPer. mašk); sim- “drink” (probably from MIr. *šām- from older *čyāma-, cf. NPers. ā-šām-, Khotanese tsām- “to digest”); and sōn- or šōn- “flow” (possibly from *xšaudna-). Conversely š also replaces original s, for example, šīr “garlic” (cf. NPers., Kurdish sīr).

There is also worth mentioning the initial s- in sol(a), “salt,” which is probably also from š- (cf. Parth. šwryn “salt[y],” NPers. šūr); one, however, cannot exclude the possibility of its original character (cf. Mid. Pers. sōr, Baḵtīārī, sūr, Balūčī sōr, Brahui sōr; see Henning, 1947, p. 55). Of more uncertain interpretation is ša “black,” whose š may be from *sy (cf. Sogd. šʾw but Parth. syʾw, NPers sīāh), and ṟāšt or ṟāst “right” (cf. Parth. rʾšt but NPers. rāst, Kurdish ṟāst).

A similar situation is seen in the language of those Armenians of Dersim who belong to the so-called Mirakʿian tribe, in which Armenian š has become s, for instance, sun “dog” < šun and us “late” < uš. In this dialect Armenian ǰ, č, čʿ have become j, c, cʿ (e.g., jur “water” < ǰur, cut “chicken” < čut, and cʿor “dry” < čʿor).

In the dialect of northern Dersim the voiceless and voiced stops k-, g- are sometimes palatalized in initial position, for instance, čē or kē, kaya “house, home” (cf. NPers. kada, Ṭālešī ka), čanā, čayna, čēnakʿ or kʿaynakʿ “girl, maiden” (cf. Av. kainiiā-, Mid. Pers. kanīg), and ǰī “excrement” (from MIr. *gūh, cf. Pers. goh, Kurdish gū).

Morphology

Nouns and pronouns

Two grammatical genders are clearly distinguished in substantives, adjectives, pronouns, and verbal forms. The nominative singular masculine is unmarked; the feminine usually takes the ending short unstressed -i. The plural endings are -(ā)n, -ī, and -ē for both genders. There are two cases, direct and oblique, which are distinguished in the singular: masculine -ī/-Ø, feminine -ē/-i/-Ø, but not in the plural. The eżāfa is masculine singular -ē/ĕ/, -ō/, -dē/, -di/, -dō and feminine singular -(y)ā/ă, -dā/ă(y). The plural form for both genders is usually -ē, as in nē pʿōstālē min “these my shoes.”

The two cases are distinguished in the personal pronouns, as well (Table 32). In addition, the third person pronouns have a possessive form derived from Old Iranian *haca “from” plus the oblique form of the pronoun.

To be compared with the possessive forms are Kurdish žē, Aftarī ǰūn, Tākistānī ǰā, ǰanā, Ṭālešī čay, čavōn, Semnāni masc. žo, fem. žin, and the like.

Verbs

The verbal system is based on two stems, present and past, which correspond to the older present stem and past (passive) participle. The present tense is formed from the present stem plus the formant -an-/ -(i)n- derived from the Old Iranian present participle in *ant(a)- (cf. Pers. -anda) for instance, barm-an- “weep, cry” (Parth. bram-).

If the stem ends in r this is assimilated to the following n: kar- but kan-an- “do,” *yar- but yan-n- “come.” The present stem without -an- occurs in the subjunctive (aorist) and imperative, for instance, karō “may he be.” Some verbs take the preverb bi- in the subjunctive and imperative, for instance, bērī “come!” The imperfect is made from the present stem plus the suffix -ā/ănī or -inī without personal endings, for example, ti āgayrā-ynī “you were walking.”

The endings of the present tense (gender marked only in the singular) are shown in Chart 3. The endings of the past tense are regular. Occasionally the feminine third-person singular of intransitive verbs takes the feminine ending -i (masc. -Ø). The past tense of the transitive verbs takes the so-called “(split) ergative” construction, in which the (logical) direct object is in the direct case and the agent in the oblique case, for example, tʿō az ašt-ā(n) “you have left me,” literally, “by-you I left-am” (cf. Kurmānjī ta az kuštim “you have killed me”).

A secondary (regular) conjugation is formed by affixing -ā- to the present stem, past stem -āy-, for example, ṟāmā “he ran away.”

The passive of transitive verbs is expressed either by periphrastic constructions or by a secondary conjugation (as in Gūrānī and Mokrī Kurdish) formed with the passive morpheme -ya-: present stem in -(y)ēn-, past stem in -(i)yā-. This passive is conjugated as an intransitive verb and is used only when the agent is not expressed or is unknown.

Both the infinitive and the active (present!) participle are formed from the past stem. The infinitive ends in -ʿī/ĭš from Middle Iranian -išn (only exceptionally used with past stems) and the participle in -ōγ, -ōx, probably borrowed from the Armenian suffix for the noun of agent -oł/-oγ, as intervocalic k does not become x or γ in Dimlī (cf. Asatrian, 1987, p. 160).

Examples or the infinitive: āmāyīš “to come” (cf. Mid. Pers. āmadišn), kardī/ĭš “to do,” ṟāmāyīš “to run away,” ṟōtiš “to sell,” wandī/ĭš “to read,” wātiš “to say.” Examples of the present participle: ṟāmāyōx “runner,” ṟōtōx “seller, vendor,” kardōγ “doer, maker,” wandōγ “reader.”

A characteristic feature of Dimlī is the use of postposition -rī, -rā to form the ablative, as in harzanī-ri “from Harzand” (cf. Kurdish where -rā expresses the instrumental).

Linguistic position of Dimlī

After their migration in the Middle Ages, for almost a millennium the Dimlīs had no direct contact with their closest linguistic relatives. Nevertheless, their language has preserved numerous isoglosses with the dialects of the southern Caspian region, and its place in the Caspian dialect group of Northwest Iranian is clear.

The Caspian dialects comprise Ṭālešī, Harzan(d)ī, Gūrānī, Gīlakī, Māzandarānī, and some dialects in Tātī-speaking areas and in the area around Semnān. Historically the Caspian dialects belong to the “Northwest Iranian group of languages” and are related to Parthian (see Windfuhr). The isoglosses are of historical phonetic, morphological, and lexical order.

The typically North Iranian and Northwest Iranian phonetic features found in Dimlī include the developments of Indo-European *ḱ and (Indo-Iranian) *ts to *s, *ḱw to *sp, *ǵ(h) to *z, *dw- to b- and the preservation of *θr from Indo-European *tr. Examples of *s from Indo-European *ḱ and Indo-Iranian *ts include saṟa “year” (cf. Parth. srd, Pers. sāl), pas (cf. Av. pasu-), dis or dus “kind, form” (cf. Mid. Pers. dēs), māsī “fish” (cf. Skt. matsya-, Av. masiia-, Pers. māhī).

Examples of *-sp- from Indo-European *ḱw include aspār “horseman” (OIr. *aspa-bāra-, cf. OPers. asa-bāra, Pers. savār, Kurdish siyār), āspiǰ/ža “louse” (cf. Av. *spiš-, Pers. šepeš). Examples of *z from Indo-European *ǵ(h) include zāmā “son-in-law” (cf. Ṭālešī zāmā, Kurdish zawā, Pers. dāmād), zān- “know” (cf. Av. zanā-, Pers. dān-), zaṟn “gold” (cf. Av. zaraniia-, Pers. zarr); az “I” (cf. Av. azəm), dēs and dēz “wall” (cf. Av. daēza-), barz “high” (cf. Av. bərəzaṇt-, Pers. boland).

Examples of b- from Old Iranian *dw- include bar “door” (Parth. br, but Pers. dar), bīn “other, this” (cf. Parth. byd, but Mid. Pers. did, Pers. dīgar).

Old Iranian *θr further became *hr, which in initial position acquired a supporting vowel in the modern languages, as in hī/ĭra/ē/i “three” (cf. Parth. hry, Av. θrāiiō, versus Pers. se < *çaiiah), but between vowels became r, for instance, mār(i) “mother” (cf. Av. māθrō, gen. of mātar-), āwrā/ă (cf. Av. apuθrā- < *ā-puθra-, but Kurdish āvis, Pers. ābestan < *āpuçā-).

Other typical early Northwest Iranian phonetic features include: Preservation in initial position of Old Iranian *č and *ǰ (as ǰ or j [dz]), which in other positions became ǰ and ž or z, respectively, for example, *č: či “what” (cf. Pers. če), čarx “wheel”; pōnj or pōnǰ “five” (cf. Pers. panj), ṟōǰ “day” (cf. Av. raocah-, Pers. rūz), vāǰ- “say” (cf. Parth. wāž-), (a)ǰēr “downward, below” (cf. Kurdish žēr, Pers. zīr); (a)ǰōr “upward, above” (cf. Kurdish žōr, Mid. Pers. azabar); lōǰina “flue, aperture” (cf. Mid. Pers. rōzan); ǰana or ǰiina “woman, wife” (cf. Av. jaini-, Kurdish žin, Pers. zan), daž/z “ache, pain” (from OIr. *daǰi-?).

Dimlī gōn(i) “blood” corresponds exactly to Parthian gwxn, the relation of which to Old Iranian *wahuni- (Gūrānī winī, wun, Pers. ḵūn = Kurdish, all from *xwaun-, a transformation of OIr. *wahuni-) is uncertain.

The phonetic isoglosses of Dimlī in modern times overlap to varying degree with those of the Caspian dialects, Kurdish, Persian, the Central dialects, and the like (see Henning, 1954, pp. 174-76; Windfuhr).

The most characteristic are the following. Initial *x- became h- or was lost, as in Gūrānī, for example Old Iranian initial *x- became h- or was lost, as in har “donkey” (Av. xara-, Gūrānī, Lorī har, versus Kurdish kʿar, Pers. ḵar, etc.), yānī “spring, well” for *hānī (Mid. Pers. and Parth. xānīg, Gūrānī hāna, versus Kurdish kānī). Initial *xw- became w-, as in the Kandūlāyī dialect of Gūrānī, for example, wala “ash” (versus Kurdish xwalī “soil”), wā/ă(y) “sister” (versus Pers. ḵᵛāhar), war- “eat” (versus Pers. ḵordan).

Initial *fr- became *hr-, which either received a supporting vowel, as in harā “wide, far” (versus Pers. farāḵ), or became ṟ-, as in ṟōtiš “sell” (also in the Central dialects, versus Pers. forūḵt)

Survey of typical phonetic developments

Dimlī has preserved the Middle Iranian maǰhūl vowels ō, ē (cf. gōs/š “ear,” bō(y) “smell,” gēs “hair,” etc.). The corresponding diphthongs are secondary, however; au is from older *-aw-, *-ap-, *-ab-, *-ag-, or *-af-, whereas ai is the result of phonetic combinatory changes.

The Old Iranian voiceless stops *p, *t, *k remained in initial position or became the apirates pʿ, tʿ, kʿ; *t and *k also remained after s and š, but became d and g after r. Examples of *p include pas “lamb, ram” (see above) and pʿīza “belly” (cf. Av. *pāzah- “chest,” Parth. pʾzʾh “in front”). Examples of *t include t’au “fever” (cf. Pers. tab), t’ars “fear” (Cf. Pers. tars), kʿārd(i) “knife” (cf. Pers. kārd), pʿōrd “bridge” (also pʿird influenced by Kurdish; cf. Kormānjī pʿir, Southern Kurdish pird; Pers. pol); ā/ăstik, ā/ăsta “bone” (cf. Av. ast-); ā/ăstāra “star” (cf. Pers. setāra).

Examples of *k include kʿār “work” (cf. Pers. kār); čē, kaya “home”(see above); kū/ŭtik “dog” (cf. Sogd. ʾkwty /əkuti/, Oss. kuj, Kurdish kūčˊ/čik, etc.), hū/ŭs/šk “dry” (see above), varg “wolf” (cf. Av. vəhrka-, Pers. gorg); exceptionally k remained in hāk “egg” (Fārs dialects hāg, Ḵūrī xeik).

Between vowels *p became -u-/-w-, and *t became y or was lost. Examples of *p include āu “water” (cf. Pers. āb); āwrā/ă “pregnant” (see above); šau “night” (cf. Pers. šab); ārya, āyra “mill” (from OIr. *ār-θry-? cf. Kurdish āš, NPers. ās-yāb< *āç-); kawtiš “fall down” (cf. Mid. Pers. kaft).

Examples of *t include čē, kaya “house” (from *kata-, see above) and wā(y) “wind” (cf. NPers. bād). Exceptionally we find d, as in ǰidā “separated, different” (cf. Kurdish ǰihē, Pers. jodā). Note the secondary -t- in the group sr > str in astiri, ī/ĭštrī “horn,” as in Kurdish strī, from Old Iranian *srū-.

The Old Iranian voiced stops *b and *d are preserved only in initial position, *g in initial position and in the group *rg. The group *rd became ṟ. Between vowels the voiced stops were mostly lost. On the palatalization of g to ǰ, see above. Examples of *b- include bō(y) “smell” (cf. Pers. bū), biz/ža “goat” (cf. Pers. boz), b(i)raw(i) “eyelash” (< *bruwa-; cf. Pers. abrū), aspār “horseman” (OIr. *aspa-bāra-). Examples of *d include darg “long” (cf. Av. darəγa-, Pers. dīr), pāī “foot” (cf. Av. pāδ-, Pers. pā), saṟa (see above), var(a) or val(a) “neck” (but NPers. galū, Baḵtīārī gyēl, Māzandarāni and Gīlakī gē/ĕl); zaṟa “heart” (cf. Av. zərəδaiia-, but Gūrānī zil, Pers. del), gara or gaṟa “complaint” (but Pers. gela, Kurdish gilī), kʿōl(i) “hornless (goat)” (from OIr. *kṛdu-?).

It should be noted that Dimlī words with -i- before r/l, as in ādir “fire,” mil “neck,” vil “flower,” are likely to be loanwords from other Iranian dialects (cf. mol and vel in Fārs dialects). Examples of *g- include gōs/š “ear” (cf. Pers. gūš), gā(w) “cow” (cf. Pers. gāv), but ǰī or gī “excrement” (see above); darg “long” (see above); ṟau “swift” (cf. Av. *raγu-).

The Old Iranian spirants, *f, *θ, *x, developed variously. The *f was lost in the cluster *-ft- in s/šit “milk” (cf. Parth. šyft). On *fr, see above. The group *-θn- became -sn- in ārāsna, ārisna “elbow” (cf. Avestan araθni-, but OPers. arašni-, Pers. araš). Similarly *x was lost in the cluster *xš-, as in šau “night” (see above), but remained in words such as čarx (from Persian?). On initial *x- and *xw- , ee above.

On Old Iranian *s and *z, as well as the interchange of s- and š, see above. The Old Iranian groups *-st-, * -sn-, and *-sr- are preserved (on *sp, see above), as in ā/ăsnāwi “swimming” (versus Pers. šenā); hars(i) “tear” (cf. Av. asru-, Pers. ašk from *asruka-), askaft “cave” (from *skā/ăfta-, versus Pers. šekāft). Old Iranian *š remained in Dimlī, as opposed to Kurdish, where intervocalic š regularly became h. Example include goš or gōs “ear” (Kurdish guh), šaš “six” (= Pers.), pāšna “heel” (= Pers., but Kurdish pa(h)nī), pānušna, ṟōš/s(a)yā “light, illumination” (cf. Pers. rowšanāʾī, but Kurdish ṟō(h)nāyī), tayšan “thirsty” (cf. Pers. tešna, but Kurdish tʿī(h)n).

Old Iranian *y- became ǰ-, as in Persian, but *w became v (rather than b- or g-, as in Kurdish, Persian, etc.). Examples of *y include ǰau or jau “barley” (cf. Av. yauua-, Pers. ǰou, Kurdish ǰa, but Gūrānī yaw, yaya), ǰidā (see above). Examples of *w include vazd (cf. Av. vazdah-, but Kurdish baz), vayšān or vaysān “hungry” (but Kurdish birčī, Pers. gošna for gorosna), vāris “rain” (but Pers. bāreš), vā(y) (see above), vayva “bride” (cf. Kurdish būk, Judeo-Pers. bayōg), varg “wolf” (see above), vinī “lose, waste” (cf. Mid. Pers. wanī), vāz- “run” (cf. Pers. vazīdan “to blow” of the wind), vā/ăš/s “grass” (cf. Parth. wʾš, Av. vāstra-? “fodder”). Where b- occurs instead of v- it may be assumed to be a borrowing from Kurdish or Persian, for instance, bar “stone” (cf. Kurdish, Lorī bard) and gumān “doubt, surmise” and guna “sin” from New Persian via Kurdish.

Old Iranian *m was preserved in all positions in Dimlī but not in Kurdish, where it became v between vowels; examples include maḡwā/ă “fruit” (cf. Pers. mīva), dām(i) “trap” (Pers. dām, but Kurdish dāw), āmōr “counting” (cf. Pers. āmār), ām(i)nān “summer” (cf. Mid. Pers. hāmīn, but Kurdish hāvīn), (h)arma(y) “shoulder, forearm” (cf. Av. arəma-), mīr “dough” (cf. Pers./Ar. ḵamīr, but Kurdish havīr).

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Morphological isoglosses

The most important morphological isoglosses which link Dimlī with the Caspian dialects are the pronominal possessive forms from *hača plus the pronoun and the formation of the present indicative from the old present participle in *-ant(a)-. The past stem of the secondary conjugation ends in -ā from *-ād, as in Parthian. Exclusive to Dimlī are the infinitive ending -ī/ĭš from *-išn and the ablative use of postposition -rī/ā (Asatrian, 1990, p. 162; idem, 1992c, p. 26).

Lexical isoglosses

These isoglosses include Old Iranian *arma- “forearm” (Dimlī (h)arma(y), Ṭālešī ām, cf. Oss. ā/ărm, versus *bāzu- in Pers. bāzū, etc.); Middle Persian āyišm “moon” (Dimlī ā/ăš/smā/ă, āsmi, Tatī ušmā, Ṭālesī ovšim, Harzanī öšma); Dimlī baurān “dove” (Oss. bälon “domestic dove”; cf. Lithuanian balañdis “dove”); Old Iranian *bram- “weep, cry” (Parth. bram-, Dimlī barm-, Māzandarānī barm-, Harzanī beram “weeping,” Ṭālešī bāme, Tātī berām, Gīlakī barmā, Aftarī burme; cf. in the Central dialects Nāʾīnī biremba; versus Pers. gerya, etc.).

Old Iranian *kanya- “woman, girl” (Dimlī kʿaynakʿ, čanā, Harzanī kīna, Ṭālešī kīna, Tatī kīna, Galīnqaya kina, čina, versus Pers. ḵāna; marginal lexeme in Pers. kanīz and Kurdish kinik); Old Iranian *kata- “home, house” (Dimlī kaya, čē, Ṭālešī ka, Gūrānī ka, Tatī kā, Galīnqaya kar, Harzanī kar, čār, Aftarī kiye; cf. in the Central dialects Ḵūnsārī kī(y)a, Nāʾīnī kiya; marginal lexeme in Pers. kade and Kurdish kadīkirin “to domesticate (animals)”); Old Iranian *ragu- “quick, swift” (Parth. raγ, Dimlī ṟau, Harzanī rav, Ṭālešī ra, Tatī rav, Semnānī rayk, cf. Oss. räw, rog “light,” versus Pers. zūd); Old Iranian *uz-ayara- “yesterday” (Av. uzaiiara- “afternoon,” Dimlī vīžēr(ī), vīžēr, Gūrānī uzera, Harzanī, Tātī zīr, Tākistānī, Ṭālešī azīra, Aftarī yezze, versus Pers. dī-rūz); Old Iranian *waxš- “burn” (Parth. wxšyndg “blazing,” Dimlī vaš or viš-, Harzanī vaš-, Ṭālešī vaš-, Tatī vaš-, versus *sauc- in Pers. sūḵtan, etc.); Old Iranian and common Northwest Middle Iranian *xšwipta- “milk” (Av. xšuuipta-, Parth. šift, Dimlī š/sit, Gūrānī šit, šifta, Ṭālešī šit, Harzanī, Aftarī šet, Tātī še(r)t, versus Pers., Kurdish šīr < *xšīra-); Old Iranian *upa-sar(a)daka- “spring(time)” (Mid. Pers. ābsālān, Dimlī ūsāṟ(ō), vazārī, Ṭālešī āvāsōr, Harzanī āvāsōr, classical Pers. ābsālān); Avestan vazdah- “fat” (Dimlī vazd “fat, oil”; cf. Kurdish baz); and Parthian wāš “fodder” (Dimlī vā/ăš/s, Ṭālešī, Māzandarānī vāš, Aftarī vāšt, Semnānī voš, versus Parthian gwyʾw, Pers., Kurdish giyāh, gīhā).

Also to be noted is Dimlī ṟīz, ṟēs “rice” (*wrī/ĭzna-; cf. Sogd. ryz-, versus Pers., Kurdish, etc., berenǰ < *wrī/ĭnza-). Relatives of the negative particle Dimlī činyō/ā “no, not” are found in Harzanī čini(ya) and Āẕarī čī/ĭnī/ĭ.

Words found only in Dimlī include angāz, hangāž “plough handle” (< *han-gāza- < *gāza- “take, accept” found in Sogd. ptγʾz-, Khotanese pajāys-, etc.; it cannot be from Armenian; see Vahman and Asatrian, p. 272); āz “generation, offspring” (Man. Mid. Pers. āzn(ān), Arm. lw. < Parth. azn “people, generation,” azniw “noble”); āz(i) “branch” (Mid.Pers. azg, Arm. loanword from Parthian azg “race, kind, nation”); ask(i) “goat” (Avestan aza-, Mid. Pers. az(ag); different from Kurdish āsk “deer” from *āsuka-, cf. Mid. Pers. āhūg, Pers. āhū); gauš “weak, coward, greedy” and gaušakay “weakness, cowardice” (possibly related to Sogd. γβs- “to be fatigued”); haw(i) or hiw(i) “laughter,” hawāyīšʾ present stem hwī/ĭn- “to laugh” (cf. Oss. xūdln); kay “play, game” (Mid. Pers kadag “game, joke,” Sogd. kʾtʾk-, Arm. lw. < Parth. katak “joke”; cf. Jowšaqānī koy “game”); sīr-, in present stem sīn(a)n- “I love” (< OIr. *srīra-; cf. Av. srīra- “beautiful,” Sogd. šyr’kk “good,” Parth. šīr-gāmag “friend”; probably not from Arm. sēr, sir- “love”; see Asatrian, 1987, pp. 166-67); and vistiš and fīnāyīš (or finā-) “to throw,” fīnyāyīš “to be thrown” (Mid. Pers. wistan “to shoot,” present stem from *wid-na-) with ṟā-vistiš “to spread, lay, put” (Galīnqaya fest-, fesn- “to throw, spread”), cf. Lorī bistan “to put down, to cast a foal” (before time).

Dimlī words without clear Iranian etymologies include diǰn(i) or dižn(i) “rain” (< OIr. *danǰa-? cf. IE *dhengṷo-); for “rain” vāris, vārān and Turkish yāḡmūr are also used in Dimlī.

Of the numerous borrowings from Armenian (exceeding perhaps those from Kurdish or even Turkish) the following may be mentioned: aks/cʾīg “woman, girl,” āvilīk “broom,” bōč, pōč “tail,” būǰūr “small,” gāb “Rheum L.,” hārs “bride,” hēsān “whetstone,” čirtʿān “waterpipe,” gōǰā/ăg(i) “button,” gōm(a) “cattle shed,” hāst “hard, rigid,” hāgōs(i) “furrow,” hīm “root, base,” hēǰ “cross” (Arm. xačʿ), hōllik “hut, shack,” hūrā/ăkʿ “hatchet, ax,” ǰāγ/x(i) “wire mesh,” kʿa/irōn “beam, girder,” kāl “thrashing floor,” kālān(i) “scabbard, sheath,” kʿalandī “scythe,” kiray “lime,” kirya, kirē “Sunday,” kiṟīk “neck,” kōra/ēk “a kind of lentil,” kʿušna/i “rye,” ōzōr “branch,” pāč “pod, grain,” pʿanǰār “vegetable,” pʿūrt “wool,” sāvār “pearl barley, spelt,” sēmiga “threshold,” sūnk/g “mushroom,” xēγ(ō), xīntʿ “mad, insane,” xōr “deep,” xōnj, xōz “pig,” zīl(ik) “sprout.”

Literature in Dimlī

The earliest surviving literary works in the Dimlī language are two poems with identical titles, Mawlūd (Genesis), dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The earlier, consisting of 756 eleven-syllable verses, is by Malā Ahmedē Ḵāsī, the other by ʿOṯmān Efendī, mufti of Siverek. There is also a minstrel tradition going back to the medieval period; a number of Dimlī bards have composed both in their mother tongue and in Turkish, for example, Daymī, Dāvūt Solārī, Pīr Solṭān, ʿAlī-Akbar Čīčak, Yāvūz Tōp, Arif Sāḡ, Sulaymān Yildiz, and Rahmī Sāltok (Zilfi, p. 6).

Nevertheless, Dimlī has attained genuine literary status only in recent decades, owing to the activities of a number of writers, poets, and political leaders (e.g., Eulbekir Pamukçu, Ališan Karsan, Hesen Dewran, Zilfi, Malmisanic, K. Astare, Reme Bir, Hesen Uşen, Heyder, Usḵan), who now live abroad, mainly in western Europe. At present numerous newspapers, magazines, and bulletins are being published in Dimlī (e.g., Piya [formerly Ayre], Raştiye, Ware, Raya Zazaistani), and the number is increasing.

Την βιβλιογραφία και παραπομπές θα βρείτε εδώ:

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dimli

Επιπλέον:

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/gurani

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/alawi-the-nesba

----------------------

Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.: https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250575732

https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/zaza_qizilbash_27_9_2019.docx

https://vk.com/doc429864789_619410998

https://www.docdroid.net/l2PwUM9/zaza-kizilmpasides-tis-toyrkias-enantia-se-erntoghan-islamistes-koyrmantzi-kourdoys-kai-oloys-toys-ditikous-docx

Nasir almolk Mosque/ Shiraz/ Iran

Photographer: reza adeli

Africa First Project

Groundbreaking Call of Yahaya Ezemoo Ndu, President of the African Renaissance Project

I herewith republish the proclaimed call with which the pioneering African politician, intellectual and champion of the African Renaissance Yahaya Ndu invited all Africans to engage in the ultimate battle to save Africa from the lethal dangers that the ailing, yet criminal, Western colonials embody for the Black Continent.

Without a shred of exaggeration, this is the founding text in which all Africans will feel their minds and hearts excellently reflected. It was first published on the 2nd February 2025 here:

Modern Ghana

Africa First Project

Africans and black people from allover Africa and the world over are being urged to wake up from centuries old slumber and realize that now

Africa First Project

Africans and Black people from all over Africa and the world over are being urged to wake up from centuries old slumber and realize that now is the time to unite as one and work for the actualization of the African Renaissance as that is the only way forward to move the continent and it's over one billion people out of poverty, dependency, disease, needless wars, underdevelopment and destitution.

We must realize that no one will develop Africa for us and that we must develop Africa ourselves.

We must overcome the artificial barriers inhibiting our togetherness and turn all our disadvantages into advantages.

Our brothers and sisters outside Africa especially those, who are being harassed by the authorities of their countries of domicile, should not despair, rather they should seize the opportunity of the time to team up with their brethren at home in Africa to build Africa, to develop beyond every other part of the world, including the United States and China, as we have all it takes to achieve this.

After all, we are the undisputed and undisputable mothers and fathers of all of mankind; civilization started with us, and further we taught the world all that it knows.

Africa and the Black world do not lack in manpower; Africa and the Black world do not lack raw materials or land space.

Although fortunate and unfortunate facts of History have spread us all over the world perhaps more than any other group of people, the realities of modern communication and information technology -if deployed effectively- would turn our disadvantages into advantages and make us the most formidable group in all the world.

All we need is a well-thought out and ordered synergizing of our intellectual capital under a trusted and mutually beneficial continent and worldwide administration that is just, transparent and pan-African in all ramifications.

We must realize that not only did we, Africans, invent the phenomenon of democracy, but that our history is replete with experiences of benevolent and malevolent oligarchies, theocracies, military regimes, etc.

Experience has taught us not to prefer military regimes to civilian regimes or civilian regimes to military regimes or theocracies or oligarchies or any other forms of government, as all could be good or bad, and as no intron is intrinsically good or bad.

What we Africans truly prefer is good governance over bad governance no matter what.

Therefore, we must respect the rights of all peoples and nations in Africa to operate any forms of government that they find suitable for themselves and work with them devoid of any holier than their attitude for African development, unification and Renaissance.

Traditional rulers and religious leaders from all across the length and breadth of Africa should bond themselves together into a continental board of trustees and superintendents over African and Black intellectuals from all over the world and come up with a brotherly arrangement; thus, they will organize the development of all African nations and their Diasporas in a systematic and systemic circuit and order, building an encouraging solidarity, establishing a fraternal unification, and eliminating all forms of wars, strives, diseases and poverty.

As Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria's first president, said in his book 'Renascent Africa':

"Educate the Renascent African to be a man. Tell him that he has made definite contribution to history. Educate him to appreciate the fact that iron was discovered by Africans; that the conception of one God was initiated by Africans, that Africans ruled the world from 763 to 713 B.C.; that while Europe slumbered during the dark ages, a great civilization flourished on the banks of the Niger, extending from the salt mines of Taghaza in Morocco, to Lake Chad right to the Atlantic.

Narrate to him the lore of Ethiopia, Ghana, Melle, Mellestine and Songhay.

Let him realize with the rest of the world that, while Oxford and Cambridge were in their inchoate stages, the University of Sankore in Timbuktu welcomed scholars and learned men from all over the Moslem world".

It is clear to all discerning individuals and groups that the African Union, ECOWAS and all such, so-called regional and sub-regional, organizations in Africa have lost their usefulness and as a matter of fact many if not all of them have become a disgrace; it is degrading to the dignity of Africans, and increasingly so by the day.

If a president of the United States can sit in Washington D.C. and order the armed forces of his country to conduct bombing in Somalia, an African nation, without being authorized to do so by the African Union and the people of Africa, then it is clear that the African Union has outlived its usefulness and it should therefore be immediately disbanded.

African people should set up an all-African electoral commission to conduct direct elections to elect those to lead Africans.

As a matter of fact, the present African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia was built and donated by an Asian country - China.

This is a disgrace; it is totally unacceptable to all true sons and daughters of Africa, and all the Black people.

The new African Union by whatever name so called should operate from a headquarters built and funded 100% by Africans - even if it has to be a hut.

We Africans and all the Black people must take charge of our affairs in all ramifications, especially in security.

All non-African troops, by whatever appellation, operating and stationed in Africa should be asked to vacate Africa and return to their own nations and continents.

After all, a vast majority -if not all- of the security challenges confronting African people are orchestrated from the same foreign and non-African nations that claim to love Africa more than Africans do.

Alhaji Yahaya E. G. K. Ndu

President

African Renaissance Project (ARP)

Enugu, Nigeria

===================

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Groundbreaking Call of Yahaya Ezemoo Ndu, President of the African Renaissance Project First published on the 2nd February 2025 here: https:

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Shah Mosque , Isfahan, Iran

(via Fascinating Persian Mosque Ceilings: A Manifestation of Islamic Architecture - Real Iran)

Currently in love with Minoan offerings depicted in Egyptian tombs